Basic Premium

The table below displays a list of the top 50 largest global CLO managers, ranked by their global CLO assets under management (AUM) in USD billion as of December 31, 2023.

Excess CCC buckets, defaults, discount obligations, and losses from trading can all reduce the OC ratio. Typically, OC test cushions decrease over time as deals mature. The tables above display the OC (BB) test cushions, segmented by vintage year, based on Intex runs from January 22, 2024, and previously from November 17, 2023.

Below are tables presenting the MVOC (AAA-B) and EQ NAV of US BSL CLO deals by vintage, based on asset prices as of January 19, 2023.

Please refer to the table below for the comprehensive list of EU CLO managers and their assets under (EU CLO) management (in billions), categorised by reinvestment (RI) period as of 31st December 2023, based on LCD and Intex data.

Please refer to the table below for a list of the 100 US CLO managers and their assets under management (in billions) for US CLOs, broken down by the reinvestment (RI) period as of December 31, 2023.

Tracking price buckets at 80/70/60 or below for US CLO underlying collateral can be useful in assessing tail risk in...

Below are tables presenting the MVOC (AAA-B) and EQ NAV of US BSL CLO deals by vintage, based on asset prices as of January 5, 2023.

Approximately one year ago, the CLO industry pondered where new-issue US CLO AAA spreads would land by the end of 2023. As we look ahead, what are your predictions for how the new-issue CLO AAA spreads will evolve by the end of the first half of 2024?

The table is structured with the first column listing the percentiles of the prepayment and purchase rates. The second column displays the actual annualized prepayment rates during the post-reinvestment (RI) period. The third column reveals the annualized prepayment rates during this period, assuming no purchases were made. The final column illustrates the annualized purchase rates during the post-RI period.

The table below provides a succinct summary of prepayment and reinvestment metrics for a collection of 16 EU CLO deals from 2018, with reinvestment end dates spanning from May 2022 to August 2022. It’s notable that the median prepayment rates were markedly low, at a mere 1% and 3%, respectively, for year 1 and 2 during the post-reinvestment period, primarily because most managers engaged in asset acquisitions at a median annualised rate of 15% and 21%, respectively, for year 1 and 2.

The first column in the table displays the actual annualised prepayment rates, the second column reveals the annualised prepayment rates assuming no purchases were made during the post-reinvestment (RI) period, and the third column illustrates the annualised purchase rates during the post-RI period. It's notable that the median prepayment rate was markedly low, at a mere 2%, primarily because most managers engaged in asset acquisitions at a median annualised rate of 12%. Hypothetically, should all managers have refrained from reinvesting, the median annualised prepayment rate would have escalated to 15%.

This study encompasses a sample of 95 EU CLO deals, closed in 2021 and January 2022, managed by 46 managers. The benchmark used is the Morningstar European B Ratings Loan Index.

The tables provided offer a detailed overview of the final IRRs for 1.0 US CLOs, derived from a comprehensive dataset comprising 312 US BSL CLO deals, specifically from the 2006 and 2007 vintages.

A sample of 348 seasoned deals (2015–2019 vintage deals) managed by 56 US CLO managers is included in this study. The benchmark loan index used is the Morningstar LSTA US B-BB Ratings Loan Index.

Typically, deals with high OC (BB) test cushions are expected to perform well, though this is not always the case. The median deal with an OC test cushion of 4 to 5 percentage points performed well, achieving 15 basis points (bp) of alpha. Deals with a small OC test cushion experienced more significant underperformance. Among deals with less than 1 percentage point of cushion, approximately three-quarters performed poorer than the loan index.