The table below shows the full list of CLO managers, ranked by their global CLO collateral AUM in USD billions as at 31 December 2025. A number of large US CLO managers with no current EU CLO AUM are expected to issue EU CLO deals in 2026.
The table below presents the full ranking of US CLO managers by collateral AUM, together with a breakdown of their BSL and MM AUM, based on data as of December 31, 2025.
What is the total size of the CLO market as at 31 December 2025? The total CLO market stood at...
The table below lists all EU CLO managers, ranked by their EU CLO collateral AUM (rather than CLO liabilities), expressed in EUR billions, together with their share of the €289.3 billion market as of December 31, 2025. The 18 largest managers collectively account for 50% of the market.
The table below sets out the full ranking of US MM CLO managers by US MM CLO collateral AUM (rather than CLO liabilities), expressed in USD billions, together with their share of the USD 200.3 billion market as of December 31, 2025.
The table below sets out the full ranking of US BSL CLO managers by US BSL CLO collateral AUM (rather than CLO liabilities), expressed in USD billions, together with their share of the USD 993.1 billion market as of December 31, 2025. The 22 largest US BSL CLO managers collectively account for just over 50% of the market.
A sample of 1,714 US BSL CLO deals (vintage 2013–1H 2025) is included in this study. Deals with a collateral pool factor below 55% are excluded.
Below are tables presenting the MVOC (AAA-B) and EQ NAV of US BSL CLO deals by vintage, based on asset prices as of February 12, 2026.
US CLOs’ aggregate exposure to the Central Parent (ADP/CDK Global) term loan stands at approximately USD 2.4 billion, ranking it as the 51st largest underlying exposure across the US CLO universe. As of 12 February 2026, across 1,250 US CLO deals managed by 76 managers, the average deal-level exposure stands at approximately 36 bps.
For an emerging manager, this represents a notable and rapid move toward top-tier status — at least across the AA/BBB/BB tranches — within a relatively short period of time. The progression likely reflects consistently clean portfolios characterized by very low WARF and tight WAS levels. The manager’s strategy of maintaining very clean portfolios, which has proven effective, could serve as a useful case study for other emerging CLO managers seeking to achieve competitive liability prints within a relatively short timeframe.
Managers may achieve a tight BB print where the new issue portfolio carries a tight WAS and is viewed as clean. More broadly, new issue BB tranche pricing can serve as a useful barometer of a manager’s debt performance, particularly when assessed against MVOC metrics.
The findings outlined in this article suggest that risks within the software sector remain largely idiosyncratic, rather than reflective of broad-based performance trends in the EU CLO market.
A sample of 580 EU CLO deals (vintage 2013–1H 2025) is included in this study. Deals with a collateral pool factor below 60% are excluded. Market Value Over-Collateralization (MVOC), for instance, at the BB tranche level, is calculated by dividing the collateral market value (MV) by the sum of CLO liabilities (AAA to BB). MVOC is a key point-in-time metric for valuing CLO-rated tranches, widely tracked by participants in both primary and secondary markets.
Below are tables presenting the MVOC (AAA-B) and EQ NAV of EU CLO deals by vintage, based on asset prices as of 9 February 2026.
CLOs are primarily actively managed, and some commonly used deal metrics—point-in-time indicators—can occasionally be misleading. While these metrics can be useful, they should not be considered in isolation. Additionally, combining multiple metrics does not necessarily provide a clearer picture. For example, the weighted average price (WAP) of a CLO portfolio does not measure return performance over time and can be artificially inflated by trading activity. Though WAP is helpful for quick screening, it is not a reliable indicator of whether one manager has outperformed another. The same applies to annual equity distributions—a higher distribution does not necessarily indicate better manager performance. Therefore, combining these two metrics does not necessarily offer a more accurate assessment of a manager's performance.
